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Abstract This article introduces designers to the dilemma that arises when 
twin aspects of social innovation—social means and social ends—do not 
align. Some academics have noted the anti-social, anti-political, and anti-in-
ventive effects emerging from the spread of microfinance practices. We 
discuss the tendency for social design and innovation literature to focus on 
design processes rather than outcomes, and introduce ideas from realist 
political theory to account for the corruptibility of social innovations. We 
suggest that designers can prevent the corruption of social outcomes by 
shifting from idealist “what if” scenarios to realist “who whom?” questions 
instead. 
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“Social innovation” is a concept that transcends the boundaries of academia, busi-
ness, and the public sector. Design academics and innovators have written about it. 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives and new social partnerships are just 
two of the activities businesses undertake in its name. Within the public sector, 
social innovation is a buzzword in the United Kingdom, the United States, France, 
and Scandinavia. Most notably, though, its practice has been widely promoted by 
the European Union. 
The European Commission defines social innovations as “social in both their 
ends and their means.” 1  “Social means” implies that the innovation is a process 
of co-creation involving a set of stakeholders who work in a social or collective 
manner; “social ends” implies that such practices lead to socially beneficial outcomes. 
This article will argue that these two facets of social innovation do not necessarily 
align. Although there are many proponents of “social practices” or “social pro-
cesses”—not least within the design profession—the deployment of such design 
processes do not necessarily produce socially beneficial outcomes. Indeed, this article 
endeavors to show that leveraging “the social” may well produce unforeseen nega-
tive societal outcomes, and that the rhetoric claiming that social design processes 
lead to socially beneficial results represents a false promise. As evident in debates 
between idealism and realism in political theory, well-intended and idealistic 
modes of conduct need not produce positive outcomes. As an illustrative example 
of this harsh reality, the article will discuss the case of microfinance, an oft-cited 
example of social innovation.
What’s in a Prefix? The Emergence and Meaning of the “Social”
The social value of participation has long been acknowledged in the field of design, 
and so have the conflicts and politics involved in collaborative endeavors involving 
users, 2  trade unions, 3  and civic stakeholders at large. 4  The use of the “social” 
prefix when describing a design process has become commonplace for actors who 
wish to highlight the ethical quality of their efforts. All designs can be socially 
oriented, and sometimes the social aspect of a design can emerge via a very specific 
artifact, such as a poster. For instance, design educator and writer Andrew Shea 
proposes the notion of “Community-Based Graphic Design” to mobilize commu-
nity engagement in “real world cases” through collaboratively designing posters, 
websites, or murals. 5  At the other end of the spectrum, the term social design can 
apply to something as vast and open as the future. Thus, critical design proponents 
Anthony Dunne and Fiona Raby propose an engagement with the social in the form 
of speculative “social dreaming.” 6  
Dunne and Raby, however, explicitly distance their work from social design, 
as it focuses too much on “fixing things.” 7  Their straightforward rejection of social 
design as too focused on such fixes highlights how the “social” part of design has 
become an ethical statement about designing itself. The fact that an exhibition like 
“Design for the Other 90%” at the Cooper-Hewitt Design Museum was subsequently 
displayed at the UN office in New York suggests that design practices are increas-
ingly deemed relevant to the humanitarian agenda. 8  Similarly, book titles such as 
Design Like You Give a Damn 9  and Design Revolution: 100 Products That Empower People 10  
show that designing is no longer primarily concerned with producing shiny new 
commodities. Indeed, it seems designers are finally heeding Papanek’s call for them 
to address the “real” world. 11 
Design academics’ “social” turn dovetails with a similar shift in innovation 
research. 12  Over the past few years, scholars have flocked around societal innova-
tion processes, with publishers scrambling to put out major edited volumes that 
promote the concept. 13  In many ways, the academic study of “social innovation” 14  
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builds on the notion of social entrepreneurship, 15  as evidenced by significant 
overlaps between the two in the literature. Arguably, the strong interest in social 
innovation partly stems from the fact that the public sector—notably the European 
Commission—has thrown its weight behind the concept. Indeed, one might under-
stand social innovation as a “quasi concept” 16 —though it may be found wanting 
analytically and empirically, it nevertheless provides a discursive space for aca-
demics and policymakers to meet. Thus, public bodies and think tanks have pub-
lished some of its handbooks and guides. 17  
How, then, do social design and social innovation relate to one another? 
Design theorist Ezio Manzini delineates the two concepts by suggesting that social 
design primarily addresses extremely problematic social situations—often through 
charity—and situations for which “both the market and the state fail to find solu-
tions.” 18  Social innovation, on the other hand, aims to produce “solutions based on 
new social forms and economic models.” 19  Manzini acknowledges that the distinc-
tion between the two is becoming increasingly blurred.
“Social design is increasingly oriented toward social innovation, recognizing 
that this offers the only chance for solving the problems it traditionally deals 
with. In turn, design for social innovation, facing the extensions of the eco-
nomic crisis, is more and more frequently involved in initiatives that involve 
socially sensitive issues.” 20  
Entrepreneurs and businesses are now taking on poverty, for example, by creating 
new markets where the poor sit at the “bottom of the pyramid”—a place where 
there are no victims, only potentially active consumers and self-employed entre-
preneurs. 21  Approaches such as “Jugaad Innovation” 22  and “Frugal Innovation” 23  
encompass both social concerns and innovation, as do the hacker and maker move-
ments, whose efforts are often spurred by crisis and limited resources. The human-
itarian effort called “Random Hacks of Kindness” (RHoK) is another example. Since 
2010, competitive technology development events called “hackathons,” co-spon-
sored by the UN, have brought individual designers and programmers together 
with NASA, the World Bank, and global tech giants Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo to 
seek novel solutions to problems associated with disaster management and crisis 
response. 24 
Some also tend to discuss social innovation in relation to how creativity or 
re-invention can flourish despite a scarcity of economic means. For instance, UK-
based design firm Participle sees social innovations shifting away from a “financial 
focus,” and toward a “resource focus.” 25  In the context of social entrepreneurship, 
that shift is nothing new—Charles Leadbeater’s landmark The Rise of the Social Entre-
preneur posits that the social entrepreneur’s main asset is “social capital.” 26  Despite 
a lack of capital, an entrepreneur may still trade on the basis of alternative assets, 
such as a strong standing in the local community. The social enterprise not only 
builds upon social capital, it enhances it.
Social Capital
Famously popularized by political scientist Robert Putnam, the term “social cap-
ital,” signifies “habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public-spiritedness” 27  that lead 
to three kinds of social benefits: trust, norms of reciprocity, and networks. Devel-
opment researchers present social capital and trust as key building blocks for local 
communities and democratic forms of governance, and they have thus become 
subject to research and measurement. Development economist Jose Cuesta states 
that “interpersonal trust is operationalized as an index capturing the reported trust 
in the people of the community; the belief that people … are ready to help those in 
need.” 28  As such, social capital appears to be a wholly benevolent force in society. 
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However, the use of the concept may not always be beneficial. The use of terms 
such as “social capital,” “community,” and “trust” can obfuscate the potential cor-
ruption of these forms of interpersonal relationships. As noted by political scientist 
Leah Gilbert, social capital—often promoted as the pillar of democracy—also has its 
dark side:
“Social capital can in fact play an integral role in the achievement of ends con-
trary to the public good. Thus the same social capital that facilitates citizens 
to collectively lobby for better governance may also enable organized crime 
groups to run an effective racket.” 29 
As Gilbert suggests, one must differentiate between “group-specific” social capital—
for example the kind that exists within criminal groups such as the mafia—versus 
“community-wide” or generalized trust. However, group-specific trust, often pro-
cessed through distinctive customs such as initiation rituals or assignments in tar-
geted violence, may sometimes overlap with the group-specific traditions and rites 
of local communities, especially those with very tight family bonds and hierarchies.
This insight—that there is a dark side to the social—is neglected in the lit-
erature on social innovation and design. Nevertheless, we argue that designers 
engaged in social design ought to bear this fact in mind. Similarly, designers ought 
not to confuse the social with the ideal public realm. According to development 
scholars Irene Guijt and Meera Kaul Shah, participatory projects are often ridden by 
a naïve understanding of the term “community.” 30  They suggest that projects often 
fail to regard the internal dynamics and differences of their stakeholders, hiding 
biases, gender issues, and many instances have an inadequate involvement of 
women. Guijt and Shah especially notice how “participation” itself often obscures 
women’s worlds, needs, and contributions to development, due to a simplified 
understanding of what community is. 31 
In order to discuss these problematics in further detail, the article will now 
turn to the case of microfinance, “the quintessential social innovation,” 32  and 
the go-to example that scholars and policymakers use when introducing the 
term. 33  The next section will trace this innovation, explore how it transgresses 
economic and social forms of capital, and interrogate the social repercussions of 
this mutating innovation. In short, the section aims to show how the engagement 
with “the social”—bonds of trust, communal networks, and various modes of reci-
procity—does not necessarily produce socially beneficial outcomes.
The Detrimental Effects of a Social Innovation: A Different Look at 
Microfinance
There is a large and diverse literature on microfinance, in which some authors laud 
the innovation, while others criticize it sharply. In order to disturb the notion that 
social processes produce socially beneficial outcomes, this section will focus on 
some of the more critical voices on microfinance. In so doing, it will point to three 
problematics of this social innovation, outlining the anti-social, anti-political and 
anti-inventive effects produced by its spread across the world. 
Before exploring these effects, a brief introduction to microfinance may be 
useful. Microfinance involves practices related to providing underserved commu-
nities with financial services. Most notably, these practices have been deployed 
in low-income economies, and in relation to poorer clients who would otherwise 
not have access to finance. Thus, proponents hail microfinance as a means to mit-
igate the exclusion of these individuals from the flows of credit, enabling them to 
become self-sufficient while at the same time generating development for the econ-
omies they operate in. The credit tends to be provided in the form of small loans, 
3 (2006): 334–54, DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1177/1468018106069204.
17 Robin Murray, Julie Cauli-
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Growth (San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass, 2012).
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(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 2014).
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see https://www.un.org/press/
en/2010/dev2851.doc.htm; 
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(blog), December 7 2010, 
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http://www.participle.net/
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or “microloans.” Microfinance institutions differ from traditional banks by focusing 
on providing financial services for these communities, which—given that they tend 
to lack collateral, steady employment, and verifiable credit histories—are unlikely 
prospective recipients of traditional loans. Instead of relying on collateral in the 
form of real assets, the banks instead rely on social forms of collateral—such as an 
individual’s membership in borrower groups and other social networks—in order 
to assess the creditworthiness of clients and ensure loan repayment. Indeed, one 
of the main innovations of the pioneers of microfinance is to develop the specific 
banking practices that enable microfinance institutions to deviate from the rules 
of lending usually adhered to by traditional banks. As such—referencing the earlier 
vocabulary of social innovation—it is an innovation that operates on social means, 
as it leverages social networks and tends to be introduced through participative 
processes. Moreover, microfinance innovators have worked towards social ends—
socially beneficial outcomes for both individuals and wider economies. Let us now 
turn to the ways in which these social outcomes may be detrimental rather than 
beneficial.
Anti-social Effects
Despite its track record as a rapidly-spreading social innovation, there are nu-
merous forms of critique directed at microfinance. Some of these relate to eco-
nomic matters. For instance, economists have argued that the economies of scale 
generated by large business entities are much more efficient than micro-entrepre-
neurship. 34  A larger employer creates jobs and increases worker productivity, with 
a higher possibility of sustaining business and employment. A larger employer also 
adds more to the overall development of social and physical infrastructure than 
smaller entrepreneurs. Another form of critique stems from the fact that micro-
loans may be used to “smooth consumption”—tiding a borrower over in times of 
crisis. This may cause the recipient of the loan to make non-business expenditures, 
even purchases on status items, as opposed to the investments that the loan is 
supposed to be used for. A third form of more economic critique argues that the 
mechanisms of banking push money up the ladder towards those who are already 
wealthy, exchanging non-monetized assets into more debt for the poor. 
However, the literature also points to a problematic that emerges from the fact 
that—as we saw earlier—microfinance draws upon social means. More specifically, 
the problematic emanates from the proposition of leveraging social capital as a 
substitute for collateral when financial means and real assets are scarce. Critics 
argue that this idea can become corrupted to the point where bonds of trust and 
other modes of reciprocity are being exploited for monetary gain. This, in turn, 
allows the “dark side” of social capital to come to the surface. By cutting into the 
social capital of local traditions and interpersonal trust, microfinance may stretch 
social commitments, undermining the very communities that they are supposed to 
support. Thus, the leveraging of “social” processes produces anti-social effects. 35  This 
obviously jars with the ambition of social innovations to leverage the reservoir of 
social capital—trust, norms of reciprocity, and networks—in order to enhance it, 
not deplete it.
How does this breakdown of social ties work in practice? Social forms of col-
lateral may be created by a joint liability among the poor. In such arrangements, 
anthropologist Aminur Rahman explains, “the group as a whole accepts account-
ability for repaying the individual loans of the group members.” 36  In this way, a 
group-lending scheme generates “social collateral”—a form of “organized social 
pressure from group members for its microcredit extension program.” This social 
aspect of the system cleverly uses social dynamics among the poor to ensure loan 
repayment, to “punish one person by using one’s own people.” In these cases, 
29 Leah Gilbert, “Analysing 
the Dark Side of Social Capital: 
Organized Crime in Russia,” in 
Social Capital and Peace-Build-
ing: Creating and Resolving 
Conflict with Trust and Social 
Networks, ed. Michaelene Cox 
(New York: Routledge, 2009), 57.
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gy Publications, 1998).
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32 James A. Phills Jr., Kriss 
Deiglmeier, and Dale T. Miller, 
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Review 6, no. 4 (2008): 34–43, 
available at https://ssir.org/
images/articles/2008FA_feature_
phills_deiglmeier_miller.pdf.
33 Moulaert et.al., The Interna-
tional Handbook on Social Inno-
vation, 1; European Commission, 
Guide to Social Innovation, 34.
34 Compare with Aneel Karani, 
“Microfinance Misses Its Mark,” 
Stanford Social Innovation Review 
5, no. 3 (2007): 34–40, available at 
https://ssir.org/images/articles/
2007SU_feature_karnani.pdf.
35 Note that the OED defines 
“antisocial” as something that 
is contrary “to the laws and 
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English Dictionary Online, s.v. 
“antisocial,” accessed July 28, 
2017, https://en.oxforddictionar-
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36 Aminur Rahman, “Mi-
cro-credit Initiatives for 
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MIT Press, 2005).
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43 Ibid., 23.
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where borrowers take responsibility for recovering the bank’s investment, tensions 
may arise:
“The collection of installments in the [microfinance] centre by using the bor-
rowers creates feuds among peers. They become hostile to each other, but the 
bank loses nothing and gets back its invested loans.” 37 
Critics have also pointed to a gender-related aspect of this issue. Women play a cru-
cial— but not necessarily deserving—role in the leveraging of social collateral, and 
this is acknowledged by microcredit issuers. For instance, Jaya Sharma reports on 
how a district-level official explains why an Indian Ministry of Rural Development 
program focused on women:
“Women cannot go anywhere, they can be located easily; they cannot run away 
leaving their homes; they can be easily persuaded to repay as they feel shame 
more quickly and consider non-repayment as a betrayal of family honour.” 38 
“Group-lending” or collective liability thus tends to be distributed in small commu-
nities of women. Here, a micro version of economies of scale emerges—the costs 
associated with asset reviews, project monitoring, and repayment enforcement are 
significantly lower when credit is distributed to groups rather than individuals. 39  
Still, even though the loan default rate may be around 1 percent, the interest in 
micro-credits can be as high as 50 percent (in the case of NGO lending) or 120 per-
cent (in the case of formal microcredit banks). 40  The microloans are supposed to 
fuel the growth of small enterprises, but as feminist economists Susan Feiner and 
Drucilla Barker note, industries based on home handicraft production “are almost 
all in the informal sector, which is fiercely competitive and typically unregulated, 
in other words, outside the range of any laws that protect workers or ensure their 
rights.” 41  
In this way, Rahman notes, the common narrative of female empowerment 
through credit may actually be the reverse, with “a significant pattern of women 
borrowers systematically losing control over their loans; they are even victimized 
by the process.” 42  To some degree, women are used as hostages between the bank 
and the patriarchal men.
“Most women borrowers are not the direct benefactors of the credit extended 
to them. Instead, these women appear to be mediators between their male 
household members and the bank. Thus the lending institution invests loans 
in the village to generate profit, but it uses the prevailing patriarchal norms of 
the village society and the positional vulnerability of women (immobile, shy, 
passive) for timely repayment and distribution of loans.” 43 
To Rahman, this process of “disentitlement” is the reversal of Amartya Sen’s ideas 
of giving the poor “entitlements” to development as a form of freedom. Instead, 
microcredit amplifies a form of micro-enslavement. Microcredit institutions like 
Grameen Bank explicitly claim that women are more likely to repay their loans 
than men. However, as Rahman notes, this not thanks to a sense of empower-
ment, but rather because they are forced through cultural norms—such as shame, 
which can be particularly compelling—into female submission. As Rahman sees it, 
through micro-credits patriarchy is intertwined with lending mechanisms such as 
interest, creating “new forms of domination over women in society.” 44 
In a similar vein, while the main narrative of micro-credit tells the story of 
a woman buying a sewing machine to start a larger business, many of the en-
trepreneurial opportunities facilitated by micro-credit are so insignificant that 
they do not offer any empowering experiences. Evan Selinger’s study of “Phone 
Ladies”—women lending out mobile-phones for short calls in Bangladesh—exposes 
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no empowerment, but rather “when phone ladies do their job, they are passive, 
invisible, deferential, and unremarkable…. They are viewed more as a service than 
a human being.” 45 
Critics argue that it is precisely this social mechanism that is the as-
set-turned-capital and the foundational social problem of microlending. The pride 
of individuals and social groups in developing economies—where social esteem 
is worth everything—makes them highly trusting customers, explaining the low 
default rate. And where loans are taken on social collateral and exchanged for 
social relations, the peer pressure to pay is so great it leads many borrowers into 
both a social and economic debt trap, as “borrowers who fall behind realistically 
fear public embarrassment.” 46  This has increased the rate of suicides, and ruined 
communities, as social capital is drained and the meager income gained by the 
newly-found micro-labor ends up benefiting loan sharks. 47  
Anti-political Effects
Whereas much of the criticism leveled at microfinance focuses on the anti-social 
outcomes, there are also anti-political outcomes. Here, we are following Andrew 
Barry’s delineation between “the political” and “the anti-political.” 48  According to 
this distinction, an act or phenomenon is political if it renders “a problem or object 
… open to contestation and dissensus.” On the other hand, an act or phenomenon 
is anti-political if it closes down the space for contestation. Given that critics—as 
we shall see—argue that the microfinance phenomenon has created a stifling con-
sensus on the development debate, one may argue that microfinance has had an-
ti-political effects.
Even in its early days, proponents and creditors did not promote microfinance 
as an anti-capitalist endeavor. Nevertheless, some of the initial hopes for microfi-
nance were connected to hopes about how the civil society sector—the so-called 
“social economy” or “alternative economy”—would claim a larger space within 
the economy as a whole. Indeed, in the early days, Muhammad Yunus’s Grameen 
Bank was run as a non-profit. As it turned out, the spread of microfinance has 
buttressed the position of neoliberal capitalism as the dominant mode of economic 
governance. 
In order to unpack the claim that microfinance has had anti-political effects, 
let us start by examining the proposition that the phenomenal spread of microfi-
nance has come to buttress Yunus’s assertion that “all people are entrepreneurs.” 
On that basis, the 2006 Nobel Peace prize laureate argues that credit should be 
seen as a “human right,” and the recognition of such a right would play a “strategic 
role in removing hunger from the world.” 49  Not only policymakers, private sector 
representatives, and NGOs embrace this idea—some artists also endorse it. For 
instance, the influential Danish group Superflex draws on this idea by mixing art, 
development, and entrepreneurial thinking into a form of social art practice. 50 
However, this consensus has displaced alternative propositions on how to deal 
with world poverty. By fragmenting initiative and responsibility onto individuals, 
micro-solutions may render larger political and social change more unlikely. Feiner 
and Barker write:
“The key to understanding why Grameen Bank founder and CEO Muhammad 
Yunus won the Nobel Peace Prize lies in the current fascination with individu-
alistic myths of wealth and poverty. Many policy-makers believe that poverty 
is ‘simply’ a problem of individual behaviour. By rejecting the notion that 
poverty has structural causes, they deny the need for collective responses…. 
For neoliberals the solution to poverty is getting the poor to work harder, get 
educated, have fewer children, and act more responsibly.” 51  
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Feiner and Barker thus suggest that neoliberals are active proponents of microfi-
nance programs because they “do not change the structural conditions of global-
ization,” including “loss of land rights, privatization of essential public services, or 
cutbacks in health and education spending.” For Feiner and Barker, these structural 
conditions are the true factors that reproduce poverty among women in developing 
nations. However, the microfinance phenomenon has contributed to a political 
consensus that tends to overlook such factors.
Such anti-political effects have already been discussed in the context of par-
ticipative design. Development scholars Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari point to the 
problems that arise from the idea that if designers can just improve the participa-
tive nature of design practices, such practices will get better and form the basis for 
“best practice.” 52  They suggest that there is a tyrannical potential in this tendency, 
as the focus on “how the practitioner operates” or on “the specificities of the tech-
niques and tools employed … embodies the potential for an unjustified exercise 
of power.” 53  Thus, participation has the tendency to mask the delegation of power 
and continued centralization—all in the name of “democracy” and decentraliza-
tion. This, in turn, resonates well with philosopher Jacques Rancière’s ideas on 
the current state of democracy. He posits that the type of participatory regime we 
normally refer to as “democracy” merely concerns the tiny space left unoccupied by 
the dominant order. 54  For Rancière, then, democratic participation has become dis-
armed—it concerns minor or even illusionary choices about matters where citizens 
do not threaten power. Thus, participation masks our inability to change the ruling 
order. 
Cooke and Kothari therefore suggest that practitioners of participatory 
methods need to ask themselves some important questions, such as “do participa-
tory facilitators override existing legitimate decision-making processes?” “do group 
dynamics lead to participatory decisions that reinforce the interests of the already 
powerful?” and “have participatory methods driven out others which have advan-
tages participation cannot provide?” 55  Thus, we need to be more careful about
“the naivety of assumptions about the authenticity of motivations and be-
haviour in participatory processes; how the language of empowerment masks 
real concern for managerialist effectiveness; the quasi-religious associations of 
participatory rhetoric and practice; and how an emphasis on the micro level of 
intervention can obscure, and indeed sustain, broader macro-level inequalities 
and injustice.” 56 
In the participation regime, the conceptual tools of development have been refor-
mulated in a way that aligns it with the tenets of microfinance; action becomes an 
individual responsibility, and empowerment loses its political connotation of the 
struggle for real power. In both cases, the answer to marginalization has become a 
question between perceived free and equal individuals, placing the locus of polit-
ical debate far away from more structural issues.
Anti-inventive Effects
As a third problematic, we may also point to the anti-inventive effects of microf-
inance. Again, we draw upon Barry, who posits that the dichotomy inventive/
anti-inventive deals with “the degree to which a technological or political change 
opens up the space of possibility.” 57  For instance, a certain technology may be 
anti-inventive if it “displaces or blocks off other [technical] possibilities”—note, for 
instance, how the internal combustion engine blocked the development of electric 
automobiles during most of the 20th century. In a similar fashion, one could say 
that the massive spread of the economic practices and techniques associated with 
microfinance have blocked the emergence of alternative economic practices. As 
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such, the outcomes of microfinance innovations run counter to the very promise of 
innovation itself—the idea that innovation always opens up new prospects for the 
future.
In recent years, microfinance providers have sought to provide business 
training along with the financial solutions they offer their clients. 58  Some pro-
viders explain this development by referencing the issue of clients using micro-
loans for non-business expenditures. The Swedish industrialist-turned-microfinance 
philanthropist Percy Barnevik explains: 
“Unfortunately, too many of the micro-credits have been spent on personal 
consumption, and that does not raise the standard of living…. Microfinance 
is, in itself, not a solution to the poverty problem, unless it is combined with 
comprehensive training.” 59 
For this type of microfinancier, then, the provision of credit is merely one aspect 
of a larger project: teach loan recipients to think in more businesslike terms, and 
forge an economic mindset among the poor. This economic mindset is meant to 
correspond to classic economic models—the market mechanism as the thing that 
balances supply, demand, and price; and the rational, self-interested, utility-maxi-
mizing homo economicus as the preferred model of human subjectivity. The business 
training offered to the poor serves the purpose of spreading the ontology of the 
market economy, and supplying microfinance recipients with the tools and tech-
niques that accompany it. Through this operation, a replica of the classic market 
model for governing economies is established—not only is it instilled in the minds 
of the poor, but it is also hardwired into the tools that facilitate economic action.
While this may not necessarily be a bad thing—well functioning market ar-
rangements can deliver excellent results—this aspect of microfinance invariably 
implies that the possibility for alternative modes of economic life are blocked off. 
Indeed, there are politics involved in the spread and adoption of the technologies 
that shape the economy. Michael Callon brings this type of politics to the fore, and 
suggests that radical scholars that want to change how the economy works ought 
to study the “devices intended for all Davids dreaming of ousting Goliaths.” 60  Re-
searchers, he argues, can assist in the experimentation with alternative economic 
logics, thus participating in an “inventive” effort to pave the way towards radically 
different ways of organizing economic life. Given that the economic arrangements 
based on self-interest follow a European lineage, 61  one may argue that alternatives 
arrangements are more likely to emerge in the Global South. However, the spread 
of microfinance currently seems to have the opposite effect, cementing the mode of 
economic life that prevails in the richer parts of the world. 
In this way, a social innovation like microfinance may have effects that are 
anti-inventive. Though innovation is invariably associated with the creation of the 
new, it may equally—paradoxically—buttress the old. At this point, it is important 
to note that Yunus does not seem to endorse this aspect of contemporary microfi-
nance. On the contrary, he criticizes the way contemporary capitalism promotes a 
narrow-minded and self-interested human subject. 
“The biggest flaw in our existing theory of capitalism lies in its misrepresen-
tation of human nature. In the present interpretation of capitalism, human 
beings engaged in business are portrayed as one-dimensional beings whose 
only mission is to maximize profit. Humans supposedly pursue this economic 
goal in a single-minded fashion. This is a badly distorted picture of a human 
being.” 62 
Yunus’s remarks suggest that the most recent mutation of microfinance produces 
effects that run counter to the original aims of this social innovation. Here is 
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another aspect that social innovators must bear in mind—innovations are, by their 
very nature, unpredictable. The spread of an innovation tends to be associated with 
a certain amount of drift, as the innovations are translated into new settings. In 
this way, original intentions and objectives may well become displaced as the inno-
vation travels around the world. 63  
So, to sum up, the microfinance case sheds light on three problematics that 
social designers and innovators must relate to: social innovations may produce 
anti-social effects (corroding social capital, generating frictions); anti-political out-
comes (displacing debates on political alternatives); and anti-inventive outcomes 
(suspending the development of alternative modes of economic life).
Discussion: Towards a Realist Conception of Social Design
The very idea that the “social” implies certain embattled qualities has a long his-
tory and is deeply entangled within the controversies surrounding socio-economic 
and cultural struggle. As we have seen, the universalism preconditioned by micro-fi-
nance clashes with social struggles in the commons, 64  the many forms of neglected 
affective labor in the family economy, 65  and the very forces that form the social 
bonds of community. 66  Should we be surprised that there are detrimental effects 
that may emerge from projects and processes that leverage the social? Judging by 
recent debates within social theory and contemporary art, the answer is no. In fact, 
there are several examples of social theorists and artists who have explored the 
dark sides of the social.
First, if we look to social theory, thinkers like Maurizio Lazzarato have sug-
gested that contemporary capitalism cannot be understood through pitting “the 
economic” or “the corporate” (bad) against “the social” (the good, counteracting 
force). We fail to grasp the true nature of our economy if we—in Habermasian 
terms—imagine a “system” (the economy driven by technical rationality) that 
increasingly colonizes the “life world” of citizens. Instead, Lazzarato argues that 
contemporary capitalism is defined by its very tendency to generate profits though 
the intermingling of the economic and the social. 67  Capitalism is no longer a mode 
of production (mode de production) but a production of worlds (production de mondes). 
The passions we share with our peers, and the ways in which we socialize and 
connect with others, are increasingly generated by corporations as a part of their 
efforts to “socially construct markets.” 68 
Secondly, if we look to contemporary art, artists have historically engaged with 
social capital, notably though interrogating the borders and rituals of demarcation 
that relate to such capital. Indeed, modern art has dealt with demarcations such 
as “high” versus “low,” “fine” versus “applied,” or more recently, “art fair” versus 
“social practice.” In such debates, many props and discursive tools are mobilized to 
position the actors, building arguments and rhetoric not unlike fronts of a battle. 
Since the beginning of modernism, every new art form has seen as one of its roles 
to reformulate such borders, causing Clement Greenberg to lament that “‘Libera-
tion’ has become a much-abused word in connection with avant-garde and Mod-
ernist art.” 69  Some contemporary art explicitly plays with the borders and ethics of 
the social by using participatory tactics to highlight situations of use or abuse, per-
haps most famously by artists such as Santiago Serra, elucidating and questioning 
the corrupt ethics of labour, migration, and exploitation.
The Dutch artist Renzo Martens exposes similar issues in his documentary film 
“Enjoy Poverty,” 70  which reveals some of today’s aid work as a continuation of colo-
nialism where war, famine, and aid are bought and sold for our consumption. The 
poor are not even allowed to use poverty as a resource for their own good—it is in-
stead an issue “owned” by the UN, NGO development agencies, and photographers 
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documenting the horrors of poverty and famine. Martens’s film exposes his para-
doxical attempts to teach Congolese youths how to better exploit their own poverty 
as a “natural resource,” for example by educating local wedding photographers to 
photograph poverty and suffering and sell the images abroad—a much more lu-
crative business. A photo of a starving child can net US$50 while a photo of a local 
wedding brings in close to nothing. His social innovation—letting the poor own 
the photos of their own poverty—is a failure. He exposes how the act of facilitating 
development easily turns into yet another layer of colonialism. Martens points to 
an ontological issue in design—a design intervention may undermine an extensive 
portion of the client’s agency, dragging the client into systemic dependence on 
development and more aid.
Other artist groups try to bring the format of facilitation into question, by 
bringing together other forms of publics, and using art as an arena for dialogue—
what art historian Grant Kester has called “conversation pieces.” 71  Kester uses the 
work of Austrian art collective WochenKlausur as an example. In their 1994 work 
Intervention to Aid Drug-Addicted Women, dialogues were staged between politicians, 
journalists, activists and drug-addicts to facilitate closer forms of understanding, in-
viting the participants to tour the Lake Zurich on a small pleasure boat. Kester asks: 
“Is it possible to develop a cross-cultural dialogue without sacrificing the 
unique identities of individual speakers? And what does it mean for the artist 
to surrender the security of self-expression for the risk of intersubjective 
engagements?” 72 
Aside from these somewhat abstract interventions from social theory and contem-
porary art, there is one crucial point that may be imported from the more practical 
concerns of development scholars. As hinted above, the field of social design and 
innovation may be well served by relating to criticisms put forward by develop-
ment scholars such as Cooke and Kothari, who argue that participative processes 
may obscure and sustain macro-level inequalities and injustice. 73  One particular 
point of contention is the supposed universalism of participative practices, which 
nevertheless represent the perspective of the party that holds the power in the 
process. John Hailey argues that in a situation where a participatory process takes 
place in a collectivist, high-power, distance culture in the developing world, but 
is managed on the basis of individualist low-power distance cultures of the West, 
“the process of participation is not universal and is contingent on different cultural 
norms or assumptions.” 74  Though these practices may be construed as “universal 
common sense,” 75  they should be seen as culturally specific, often representing the 
particular perspective of a stronger party. This insight from development studies 
needs to be brought into the discussion on social design and social innovation. The 
pursuit of universalist claims may obscure the power relations embedded in social 
design processes.
However, if we translate these perspectives into the concerns of designers, 
what is to be done? Given the problematics described above, practitioners of social 
design may draw inspiration from political theory, more specifically the delinea-
tion between idealism and realism. In short, idealism construes politics as primarily 
related to ideal states to be attained. Consequently, an idealist engages with the 
world through “what ifs.” Remember Buckminster Fuller’s famous words of en-
couragement directed at innovators: “Dare to be naïve.” 76  Idealism thus trades in 
possibilities, to the extent that the idealist may be accused of being too naïve about 
the whether those possibilities are attainable, and about the potential negative 
outcomes that may arise when realizing such ambitions. Thus, the alternative 
position—realism—trades in impossibilities, in highlighting the limited space of 
the feasible, and in pointing to all the ways in which the “real” world crushes the 
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ambitions of idealist. Here, in contrast to Buckminster Fuller’s advice, we may 
point to the realist Niccolo Machiavelli’s advice to innovators: “Nothing is more 
difficult to handle, more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to manage, than 
to put oneself at the head of introducing new orders.” 77 
In many ways, the design discipline seems intrinsically wedded to idealism. 
Note for instance Herbert Simon’s definition of the designer as someone who “de-
vises courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones,” 78  
and his touchstone for distinguishing design sciences from the natural sciences—
whereas the “natural sciences are concerned with how things are,” design “is 
concerned with how things ought to be.” 79  Thus, the natural sciences seem to be 
inherently realist, while the design sciences must be inherently idealist. Note also 
how design is wedded to the notion of intentionality in contemporary interpretations 
of design thinking. 80  Again, given that the realist cares only about outcomes, and 
is skeptical towards the virtue of good intentions, one may surmise that designers 
must be antithetically opposed to realism. Nevertheless, this is not necessarily a 
matter of being agnostic about outcomes. As Nynke Tromp and Paul Hekkert point 
out, 81  design performance is generally judged on the basis of design outcome. 
However, they note, the literature on social design and social innovation tends to 
focus more on “the value of the design process for collective aims.” Thus, beneficial 
social outcomes are implicitly expected as results of the social process. However, as 
shown in the case of microfinance, one can scarcely make that assumption.
Realists account for the potential for negative outcomes in different ways. For 
one, they tend to see humans as fundamentally flawed, arguing that social develop-
ments are driven by protagonists’ passions and emotions rather than the rationality 
that idealists tend to assume. Moreover, when rationality does prevail, realists tend 
to question the extent to which rationalism can tame the wild contingency of the 
real world. We find another way of accounting for negative outcomes in Machia-
velli. As argued by Pocock, 82  Machiavelli’s work can be grasped through the triad 
of virtue (virtú), fortune (fortuna), and corruption (corruzione). Virtue is that which is 
employed by a ruler in order to counter two threats—the element of chance intro-
duced by fortune, and the general tendency towards institutional decay and corrup-
tion. A fourth concept central to Machiavelli’s thought is innovation (innovazione). 
Ultimately, The Prince is “an analytic study of innovation and its consequences,” 83 —
it assesses the possibilities and threats facing an innovative prince. The upside of 
innovation is that it may assist virtue in imposing form on fortune. The downside, 
however, is that the introduction of an innovation is an inherently “uncontrolled 
act having uncontrolled consequences in time.” 84  In other words, the innovating 
prince may reintroduce the perilousness of fortuna. The disruptive potential of inno-
vation is to be treated with care and caution, as the tendency towards corruption is 
an ever-present rule of nature. Thus, it is hardly surprising that corruption rears its 
ugly head in microfinance.
Beyond this engagement with the corruptibility of the world, designers may 
also benefit from the power analysis that emerges from the realist tradition. Rather 
than idealist “what if” questions, designers—so used to thinking in terms of “the 
user”—may ask questions like “who is the ‘user’?” and “who is being ‘used’?” This 
can be rephrased in truncated form, as borrowed from Lenin by realist political 
philosopher Raymond Geuss: “Who whom?” As Geuss suggests, every social order 
is always a social achievement, and such an undertaking is “generally achieved 
only at a certain price.” 85  A new order inevitably comes at the price of someone’s 
disadvantage, and “one person’s disorder is sometimes another’s freedom,” similar 
to the way US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld called the civil war in Iraq 
an instance of “untidy freedom.” 86  As Geuss stresses, the basic political question 
has to be an extension of Lenin’s “who whom?”—“who <does> what to whom for 
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whose benefit?” 87  And Geuss continues, “To think politically is to think about 
agency, power, and interests, and the relations among these.” 88  Here, in reference 
to the discussion above on the universalism of participatory approaches, it is worth 
remembering that the “who whom?” question includes an interrogation of whose 
perspective remains dominant in a process of participation—someone’s utopia is 
always doomed to be someone else’s dystopia. 
This realist perspective on social practice can be elicited by the following series 
of questions:
• Who is the user or stakeholder? What is in their interest?
• Who is the client? What is in their interest?
• Who do you report to? What is in their interest?
• Who is invited/included and who is excluded?
• What are the structural and institutional frameworks around this action?
• How is power redistributed, who is offered power, who is it withdrawn 
from?
• How is the “social” (relationships based on loyalty and commitment) redis-
tributed or reformed?
• Who earns what in the end?
• How can reimbursement/compensation for the poorest be guaranteed? 
Though seemingly simple, such questions may act as a useful starting point for 
engaging with social design, serving as an antidote for the detrimental effects that 
may inadvertently emerge from endeavors that start from a more idealist position. 
Conclusion
This article has argued that the current rhetoric on design and social innovation 
tends to elide the tension between process and outcomes. Given the current in-
terest in socially-engaged processes, the article stresses that the use of such pro-
cesses is not a panacea for producing socially beneficial outcomes. Indeed, there is 
a risk that the focus on social process may mask the fact that such processes some-
times fail to deliver. This agnosticism regarding social outcomes is curious, given 
that design theory tends to focus heavily on the outcomes of the design process. 
Thus, we plead for a reversal of the famous formula “the ends do not justify the 
means.” Designers engaged in social innovation need to consider that social means 
do not justify poorly-evaluated, corruptible ends.
In order to counter the tendency designers have to surrender to the idealist 
proposition that social processes invariably produces beneficial social outcomes, 
we have pointed to the realist school of political thought as a source of inspiration. 
As a means to prevent social practice-informed design from generating negative 
outcomes, designers ought to acknowledge the limits of idealist “what if” starting 
points. In order to balance such idealism, designers ought to place more focus on 
the realist question of “who whom?”—who benefits from the social innovation, and 
who pays the price for the change in order?
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